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On 1 December 2013, Croatia voted in a referendum on the constitutional definition of marriage. 
Whilst recent scholarship highlighted the symbolism nature of the referendum in domestic 
politics, its European dimension has not been reflected on. Using Leconte’s notion of value-based 
Euroscepticism this article explores the role of European politics in the marriage referendum, 
using electoral data at the municipal level. As the analysis demonstrates that the referendum, at 
least partly, was a proactive attempt to halt the Europeanisation of same-sex marriage, the 
article also sheds light on local resistance to EU’s homonationalist politics.  
 





Five months after Croatia joined the European Union (EU), voters approved a citizen-initiated 
referendum to constitutionally define marriage as heterosexual matrimony, with campaigners 
both for and against the initiative tying Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) rights to 
the EU and a notion of ‘Europeanness.’ Such link between European Union (EU) and LGBT rights 
is not new, and has often been highlighted during ‘Eastern’ enlargement for post-socialist 
European states (see Slootmaeckers, Touquet and Vermeersch 2016), including during Croatia’s 
accession process. Indeed, whilst Croatia was pressured by the EU to improve its record on the 
protection of LGBT people during accession processes, especially in the field of discrimination 
(Badanjak 2014; Kahlina 2015), local LGBT activists used the EU leverage to strengthen their 
advocacy work (Kahlina 2015; Slootmaeckers and Touquet, 2016), with some politicians 
instrumentalising relevant issues by asserting the ‘Europeanness’ of LGBT rights (Vuletić 2013). 
Despite the fact that the link between the EU and LGBT rights has been acknowledged by both 
supporters and opponents of LGBT rights (Ayoub and Paternotte, 2014), the academic analysis 
 
of the 2013 marriage referendum (see e.g. Glaurdić and Vuković 2016) has paid little to no 
attention to the European dimension of LGBT politics. Political analysts, on the other hand, did 
make the link with the fact the Croatia recently joined the EU. They argued that the success of 
the civic initiative’s U Ime Obitelji (‘In the name of the Family’) campaign against same-sex 
marriage could partly be explained by the initiative’s ability to tap into growing disappointment 
of the Croatian people in the EU, which many blamed for the nation’s economic recession 
(Bilefsky 2013). These claims, however, have never been tested against voting behaviour in the 
referendum. Whilst our contribution seeks to provide empirical evidence for these political 
analysts’ claims, its main aim is to further recent scholarly debates on the referendum that 
concluded that the results could be primarily explained by support for the main electoral blocs 
in the country, with value-based and other factors being secondary (Glaurdić and Vuković 2016). 
Indeed, we argue that the European dimension of same-sex union politics cannot be ignored for 
at least two reasons. First, the referendum campaign was initiated at a time in which Croatia 
formally joined the EU, which raises the question whether the co-occurrence of both historical 
moments was a coincidence or not. Second, and more importantly, it is undeniable that LGBT 
issues in Croatia have a European character. Indeed, as already mentioned, as part of Croatia’s 
EU accession process, LGBT rights have increasingly been framed as a European value (Kahlina 
2015; Kuhar 2011; 2012; Moss 2014).1 This was especially the case in the closely related 
parliamentary debates same-sex partnerships. Indeed, Kuhar (2011) has shown that both 
supporters and opponents have used a ‘Europeanisation’ frame in the debates on same-sex 
partnerships, both before and during accession negotiations. Whilst the idea of an LGBT-tolerant 
Europe served as an example for those willing to advance LGBT rights, opponents often argued 
that Croatia should refrain from adopting legislation which goes against Croatian values (Kuhar 
                                                           
1 It is important to note, however, that LGBT activism precedes the start of Croatia’s EU integration 
process, and that the first same-sex partnership law (2003) was adopted before the start of accession 
negotiations. We, therefore, do not argue that LGBT politics in Croatia are solely the result of the EU 
accession process, but rather that the EU has become an important part of LGBT politics in Croatia (see 
also Kahlina 2015).  
 
2011). Thus, taking this historical and discursive context into account, our analysis highlights 
the on the international dimension of the referendum. 
By doing so, this article also contributes to more general debates on international LGBT politics 
and its symbolism in the field of European politics. In particular, we seek to add to the recent 
debates on local resistance against (European) ‘homonationalism.’ Homonationalism, as a 
conceptual framework, was developed by Puar (2007; see also Puar 2013) following the 
observation that nation states are increasingly defined and judged by their gay-friendliness or 
homophobia. Puar defined homonationalism as  ‘a facet of modernity and a historical shift 
marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a 
constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and 
sexuality’ (Puar 2013, p. 337). Whilst some countries and entities, including the EU, have 
embraced this historical moment by increasingly using LGBT rights as a symbol for what it 
means to be modern or even European (see also Ayoub and Paternotte 2014), others, like e.g. 
Putin-led Russia, have been resisting this development by emphasising an alternative value 
system based on so-called traditional values. Whilst examples of such resistance to EU’s 
homonationalist politics have been documented in the EU’s neighbourhood, e.g. in Ukraine, it 
can also be found within the boundaries of the EU. Consider for example recent developments in 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states. Although the CEE EU member states have 
passed several laws regulating LGBT rights (mostly in the field of anti-discrimination) during the 
period leading up to accession (Kochenov 2006), LGBT rights are said to have only entered the 
political agenda as a result of international (EU) pressure (Roseneil and Stoilova 2011). 
Consequently, LGBT rights in some of the new member state became pollicised accession 
(O'Dwyer 2012; Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016). Indeed, whereas the pressure for equal 
LGBT rights was seen as a litmus test for modernity and Europeanness by those supporting the 
‘civilizing mission’ of the EU (Graff 2006), it fuelled anger towards the EU for those who consider 
the pressure for LGBT equality as a threat to the nation and local culture (Renkin 2009). For 
 
example, in Latvia, the pressure for equal rights for LGBT persons was seen as a direct attack of 
the so-called international gay lobby on the future of the nation (Mole 2011). In Poland, the 
Kaczyński government stated at one point that it needed to prevent the ‘aggressive promotion of 
homosexuality’ because it felt that ‘although Poland may have joined the EU, they will have none 
of the “loose” attitudes toward sex’ (Graff 2006, p. 436). Thus, by analysing the European 
dimensions of the Croatian marriage referendum, we also analyse resistance to ‘European 
homonationalism,’ i.e. the article demonstrates how international LGBT politics can be employed 
in domestic politics, guiding voting behaviour in a referendum on a policy field seemingly free 
from international influence.    
Whilst some have linked this the opposition to nationalism (see e.g. Mole 2011, 2016), Ayoub 
(2014) draws attention to ‘threat perception.’ Doing so, he expanded the nationalism argument 
by highlighting that domestic opposition to the international promotion of LGBT rights, and thus 
the homonationalist moment, is mediated by the relative role of religion in the imagining of the 
nation. He has argued that ‘[t]hreat perception concerning LGBT norms depends largely on the 
degree to which the moral authority of religious institutions is tied to the histories of political 
transition and national identity’ (Ayoub 2014, p.357). Thus, in countries where the Church has a 
considerable role in defining the ‘nation’ (like in the case of Croatia, see Pavasovic Trost and 
Slootmaeckers 2015), LGBT rights as promoted by the EU can be perceived as a threat to the 
nation. Whilst these ideas are indeed valuable, we believe they do not necessarily reflect 
explicitly enough on the European dimension of LGBT politics. As such, and based on the 
observation that LGBT issues have seemingly settled themselves on the schism of pro- and anti-
EU politics (Mole 2011), we propose the notion of ‘value-based Euroscepticism’ (Leconte 2014) 
as an alternative analytical framework for the study of domestic resistance to European 
homonationalist politics. Value-based Euroscepticism, Leconte (2014) argues, is a negative 
attitude towards the EU fundamental rights policy, which is perceived as potentially infringing 
on domestic value systems. Distinct from negative attitudes towards EU membership, value-
 
based Euroscepticism should be defined as ‘the subjective perception that, as integration 
deepens, EU institutions unduly interfere in matters where not only strongly held collective and 
societal preferences, but more fundamentally value systems are at stake’ (Leconte 2014, p. 85), 
including issues such as the definition of marriage.2 Although this value-based Euroscepticism 
might seem unjustified in policy areas outside EU competences, such as the definition of 
marriage, Leconte (2014, p. 86) continues, ‘many Eurosceptics fear that there might be some 
kind of spillover process where, ultimately, EU legislation in one policy area might have an 
indirect impact on policy areas within the remit of Member States’. Fears that the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights would help to spread alternative understandings of the family are not new 
in Europe (Leconte 2008). Kopecký and Mudde (2002, p. 315), for example, found that that the 
Slovak Christian Democratic Movement ‘openly expresse[d] fears that the EU will pressure 
Slovakia to adopt policies such as the legalization of gay marriages.’ Although the EU does not 
actively pressure (candidate) member states to adopt same-sex union policies — the EU has no 
family law competences —, recent evidence has shown that such spillover effects do exist. With 
respect to same-sex partnership legislation, Kuhar (2012) has shown that Europeanisation 
frames act as soft pressure on member states to organise same-sex partnership issues in line 
with EU standards or trends. Kollman (2009) and Paternotte and Kollman (2013) have also 
highlighted the role of informal European processes of norm diffusion and elite socialisation in 
the increased recognition of same-sex unions across the continent. 
Thus, it could be expected that the referendum represents, at least partly, a proactive reaction to 
the EU’s fundamental rights policy. Whilst anecdotal evidence supports this hypothesis — a lead 
campaigner for the referendum, for example, stated: ‘There is a feeling that gay marriage and 
adoption by gays was on the agenda, and this vote was an attempt to show that there is strong 
                                                           
2 It is important to note that value-based Euroscepticism does not need to align with anti-EU membership 
attitudes. Although both dimensions of Euroscepticism are certainly correlated, it is quite possible that 
individuals sceptical of the fundamental rights policy of the EU and its potential domestic impact do not 
question EU membership. Although this distinction goes in both directions, it is much more likely that 
individuals opposing EU membership also question the fundamental rights policy of the EU.  
 
opposition to this’ (quoted in Bilefsky 2013). However, it is yet to be demonstrated whether the 
outcome of the referendum was indeed guided by value-based Euroscepticism.  
Empirically, we examine the European dimension of the marriage referendum at the level of 
cities and municipalities, following common practice in referendum research (on marriage 
referendums see, e.g., Glaurdić and Vuković 2016; McVeigh and Diaz 2009; for other types of 
referendums see, e.g., Charnysh 2015; Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013). By linking the marriage 
referendum to the previous (2012) EU referendum and the 2013 European Parliament elections, 
the article explores whether there is evidence of a relationship between the Croatian marriage 
referendum and anti-EU politics, and thus whether referendum voting behaviour is associated 
with value-based Euroscepticism in Croatia. To do so, we have compiled a dataset that combines 
the results from the 2012 EU accession referendum, the 2013 marriage referendum, and the 
2013 European Parliament Elections,3 and added socio-demographic characteristics of the cities 
and municipalities using data from the 2011 census data. Due to the fact that aggregate-level 
data does not allow for drawing conclusions on individual-level behaviour, we deem it 
important to first establish whether value-based Euroscepticism can contribute to 
homonegative attitudes. This preliminary analysis is not to determine the role of value-based 
Euroscepticism in individual voting behaviour, but is a baseline analysis to establish whether 
there is sufficient evidence suggesting a link between value-based Euroscepticism and attitudes 
towards homosexuality at the individual level. We do this because we believe that analysing the 
referendum’s aggregate voting behaviour using a value-based Euroscepticism analytical 
framework would only make sense if such a link would exist at the individual level. In sum, the 
reader should bear in mind that our results only speak to the aggregate level and cannot and 
should not be translated to the individual analysis. 
                                                           
3 These European Union related electoral data is included as a proxy for Euroscepticism. It is beyond the 
scope of this article to conduct a comparative analysis of the 2012 and 2013 referendums. 
 
To summarise, our contributions to existing scholarship are three-fold.4 Our most obvious 
contribution is extending the current debates on the marriage referendum by demonstrating 
that there were ‘European’ dimensions to the result. Doing so, we also provide empirical 
evidence for various claims made by Croatian political analysts regarding the referendum 
results. Our third contribution, which also relates to more general scholarly debates is our 
analysis of how international LGBT politics can guide political behaviour in terms of domestic 
resistance to European ‘homonationalism,’ using value-based Euroscepticism alternative 
analytical framework to explain feelings of threats to national values. The latter contribution is 
particularly salient not only in Croatia, but across new EU member states as well as for 
understanding LGBT politics in the EU’s near neighbourhood.      
In the next section, we briefly present the background of the marriage referendum, followed by a 
discussion of our datasets and the variables used to measure attitudes towards the EU at the 
individual level and proxies used for value-based Euroscepticism at the municipal level. In the 
subsequent sections, we present the results of our analyses and discuss the extent to which the 
framework of value-based Euroscepticism helps explaining the outcome of the marriage 
referendum. 
 
The 2013 Croatian Marriage Referendum 
 
                                                           
4 A potential fourth contribution of our analysis relates to discussions on Euroscepticsm. In recent years, 
scholars have sought to understand the growing public opposition to the EU, increasingly focussing on the 
role of social identity attitudes. In these studies, Euroscepticism is explained by a strong identification 
with their nation (e.g. Carey 2002), xenophobia and opposition to migration (e.g. De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden 2005), and religious intolerance (e.g. Hobolt et al. 2011). Whilst most of these studies focus 
on the determinants of Euroscepticism, little has been written on how Euroscepticism can contribute to 
these social identity variables. This article addresses this gap; it does so by analysing to what extent the 
outcome of the 2013 marriage referendum in Croatia was inspired by a value dimension of Eurosceptic 
attitudes. 
 
The history of the 2013 Marriage referendum starts in 2010, when a Croatian constitutional 
amendment was passed that removed the requirement for 50% turnout for referendums. This 
constitutional change was the result of a widespread believe amongst politicians and scholars a 
low turnout requirement would be an obstacle for a valid referendum result on EU accession – 
which would block any further progress towards membership (Podolnjak 2014). Whilst these 
fears were justified, and the constitutional amendments removing the quorum did allow Croatia 
to successfully vote for EU accession (with a turnout of less than 44 percent; 65.32 percent voted 
in favour), it ‘indirectly facilitated’ the passage of the 2013 marriage referendum (Orsolic 
Dalessio 2014).  
Within a structural context characterised by relaxed requirements for a referendum by citizen 
petition and faced with Government’s plans enact a law to recognise same-sex ‘life partnerships’ 
(Barilar and Turčin 2013), the civic initiative U Ime Obitelji (In the Name of the Family), led by 
Željka Markić and with extensive yet indirect support of the Catholic Church5, collected around 
700,000 signatures over a two-week period in May 2013 in support of a referendum on the 
question: ‘Do you support introduction of a provision into the Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia to the effect that marriage is a living union of a woman and a man?’ (Zenit 2013). The 
number of signatures crossed the threshold of ten percent of the electorate, necessitating a 
referendum of which the result would be legally binding. It was the first Croatian referendum 
held at citizens’ request.  
Whereas government-initiated referendums appear to provide governments with opportunities 
for strategic manoeuvring, including the evasion of accountability for difficult decisions (Setälä 
2006, p. 712), this citizen-initiated referendum created a precarious situation for the Croatian 
government. Moreover, the petition for the referendum presented a number of awkward legal 
questions, particularly whether the constitutionally defined mechanism for a referendum can be 
                                                           
5 Over 80 percent of Croatian citizens are Catholic, according to the 2011 census. The Catholic Church thus 
has an influential role in shaping the political and legal order in the ‘most Catholic country in Europe’ 
(Perica 2006). 
 
used on issues which may be discriminatory to a group of citizens, contravening constitutional 
protections of fundamental freedoms (Podolnjak 2014). In November 2013, the month before 
the referendum was held, the Constitutional Court delivered an opinion that there was no legal 
impediment for the referendum to proceed. However, the Court also said that a positive result in 
the referendum should not be detrimental to future developments in rights for same-sex 
partnerships in accordance with the fact that ‘[r]espect for and legal protection of each person’s 
private and family life, dignity, reputation shall be guaranteed’.6 Moreover, a joint statement by 
legal scholars from the University of Zagreb expressed the opinion that blocking the referendum 
would have dire consequences for the democratic legitimacy of the country and that approval 
must be legally binding (as per constitution; Podolnjak 2014).7 
The campaign leading up to the referendum divided the country. The Prime Minister and 
President Ivo Josipović, along with left-leaning parties in Croatia urged the electorate to vote 
against the question in the referendum. Meanwhile, the leader of the opposition, Tomislav 
Karamarko, his HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica [Croatian Democratic Union]) colleagues, 
and other parties from the right said that they supported the constitutional definition of 
marriage (Beta 2013). Although the referendum was endorsed by religious organisations, and 
representatives of the Catholic Church, Orthodox Church, and Islam, the campaign was framed in 
terms of democratic will and the protection Croatian values related to marriage and family.8 
Markić described the U Ime Obitelji position as follows: ‘it is precisely with an opportunity for 
the citizens to express their view on such an important aspect of the society as marriage, in a 
                                                           
6 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (2010), art. 35. This is briefly summarised in Orsolic Dalessio 
(2014). 
7 The full statement (in Croatian) can be found here: http://www.pravo.unizg.hr/?@=6fkw 
8 Whilst the churches, and the Catholic Church in particular played a significant role in making the 
referendum resonate with the wider population — for example, it would urge people to vote for the 
inclusion of the heteronormative definition of marriage in the constitution —, its support in the actual 
debates on the referendum was much more indirect. Hence, although the influence on religion is an a 
question worth researching, it is beyond the scope of this particular study, which aims to draw attention 
to the international dimension of the referendum. See Pavasovic Trost and Slootmaeckers (2015) on how 
the Church used the referendum to define the Croatian ‘nation’. 
 
most democratic of all procedures – a referendum – that justice will be confirmed as the very 
basis of permanent piece in the Croatian society’ (U Ime Obitelji 2013). Although the Catholic 
Church did not directly campaign, Cardinal Bozanić, Head of the Catholic Church in Croatia, said 
that elected officials have the duty to represent their citizens, so officials who had come out 
against the referendum were unfairly discriminating against a group of its citizens (Hina 2014). 
Cardinal Bozanić also wrote a letter declaring ‘Marriage is the only union enabling procreation,’ 
which was read aloud across churches in the country the day after the referendum (Bilefsky 
2013). Framing the referendum in terms of Croatian family values further resonates with latent 
nationalist feelings in Croatia, as the future of the nation would be threatened by the 
introduction of same-sex marriages (Pavasovic Trost and Slootmaeckers 2015). Although an 
explicit link to the EU was avoided by the Catholic Church, it was clearly suggested that a 
(European) threat to the Croatian family, and nation in extension, existed (cf. Ayoub 2014 on 
perceived threat). This view resonated well with the Croatian population. Indeed, a brief look at 
personal statements of volunteers on the website of U Ime Obitelji further corroborates the 
importance of ‘saving the nation’ as a motivation to support the initiative, as they include 
phrases like: ‘A healthy family is the foundation of a healthy society and a stable society 
guarantees the stable state’, ‘This is a very important thing for Croatia and it is necessary to 
involve all. The family is the fundamental unit of society, with no family no people,’ and ‘saving 
the marriage and family is the only thing that will rescue the Croatian society from collapsing.’9 
Although not always made explicit, the frequent use of this nationalist rhetoric calls for the 
protection and preservation of true Croatian values, family, and nation from Western (i.e., 
European) vices, such as same-sex partnerships, which undermine the fundamental unit of the 
Croatian society (Pavasovic Trost and Slootmaeckers 2015).  
On the other side, the opposition (the Protiv [Against] campaign) was strongly supported by a 
number of academicians, human rights organisations, and LGBT groups. The campaign was 
                                                           
9 For more personal statements see: http://referendumobraku.uimeobitelji.net/category/volontiram-jer/ 
 
framed in terms of minority protection and as a dangerous move away from ‘European’ ideals. 
President Josipović said: ‘A nation is judged by its attitude toward minorities’ (Associated Press 
2013). One political analyst, Jaroslav Pecnik, noted that the referendum showed that Croatia was 
not ‘mature enough’ to be in Europe and that it indicated a fascist turn (Kartus 2013). The major 
daily newspaper Jutarnji list made an editorial decision to oppose the referendum, since it was 
discriminatory, and would donate banner advertisement space for organisations opposing the 
vote (Radić 2013). The Protiv campaign cautioned that the same-sex marriage referendum 
would be only the start, and that new citizen-initiated referendums could be used to curb ethnic 
and other minority group rights. Protiv supporters actively tried to extend the campaign against 
the referendum beyond the LGBT issue, linking it to a more general minority protection 
discourse (Glasaj Protiv 2013). In similar vein, Vesna Pusić, the Deputy Prime Minister, warned 
that the referendum was being used as an instrument of discrimination against a minority, and 
that it would be used in the future against other minorities whether by race, ethnicity, political 
affiliation, or gender (Hina 2013). She added that everyone is a member of some minority group 
at some point in their lives. The link between the marriage referendum and general minority 
rights was further foreshadowed by anti-Cyrillic protests in the eastern city of Vukovar (April 
2013) and the campaign of Stožer za Obranu Hrvatskog Vukovara [The Committee for the 
Defence of Croatian Vukovar], launched in November 2013, to collect signatures to call for a 
referendum to curb minority language rights (Ivanovic 2013a).10  
Despite the organised opposition by the Croatian Government and a number of civil society 
actors, the marriage referendum passed with a majority of 66% on 1 December 2013, with a 
turnout of less than 38%. The result of the referendum did not differ much from those predicted 
in opinion polls conducted six months before the vote to the referendum itself; support only 
changed from 55% to 66% (see Žic 2013). The existing literature suggests three reasons for 
                                                           
10 Campaigners managed to collect 680,000 signatures (Ivanovic 2013b). The Government confirmed in 
July 2014 that the requirement to trigger a referendum had been fulfilled (Ivanovic 2014), though the 
Constitutional Court subsequently declared the question unconstitutional in August 2014 (Milekic 2014). 
 
relatively low volatility in marriage referendum voting intentions. First, when partisan cues on 
referendums are strong, there tends to be predictable patterns (Leduc 2002), and indeed, nearly 
86% of HDZ supporters and less than 40% of SDP supporters said that they would vote for the 
referendum a week before the actual poll (Lukić 2013). Second, preferences for the issue were 
defined by voters’ core beliefs, which tend to be difficult to change (Leduc 2002). Third, 
campaigns during citizen-initiated referendums may make a difference, but there is little 
comparative evidence of reversals of voting intention (Bowler and Donovan 2002), though 
effective campaign mobilisation might affect voter turnout (Leduc 2002).  
Additionally, drawing on claims by Croatian commentators in the wake of the marriage 
referendum result, a number of hypothesis about the voting patterns can be identified, of which 
the most important ones are summarised here. First, one columnist in Jutarnji list reduced the 
results to a referendum on satisfaction with the current Croatian government, stating: ‘This vote 
is not about marriage or the definition of marriage, this is a referendum against the current 
government’ (quoted in EurActiv 2013). Second, although Serbian Orthodox leaders joined the 
Catholic Church in supporting the referendum, the minority rights framing by those against the 
referendum may have found some resonance with the Serb minority in Croatia, especially after 
the aforementioned ‘anti-Cyrillic’ protests and petition for a language rights referendum. For 
example, the tiny village of Negoslavci, near Vukovar, had a vote of 75% against the referendum, 
which earned it the title of Croatia’s ‘most tolerant place’ by Jutarnji list. It has fewer than 1200 
inhabitants, who are overwhelmingly Serb. A commentary written after the referendum 
surmised that the citizens of the village linked the question in the referendum to the ongoing 
anti-Cyrillic campaign (Patković 2013). The importance of socio-economic woes in the wake of 
the global economic downturn is connected to a third explanation, which links attitudes towards 
the EU and economic conditions. As mentioned in the introduction, some analysts believed that 
advocates for the referendum were able to harness voters’ disillusionment with the EU, which 
they link to the economic downturn in Croatia. Fourth and most importantly to this study, the 
 
EU is also connected with ‘creeping secularism’ in the country, or as a campaigner for the 
referendum stated: ‘There is a feeling that gay marriage and adoption by gays was on the 
agenda, and this vote was an attempt to show that there is strong opposition to this’ (Bilefsky 
2013). In other words, there is a clear suggestion of the presence of a value-based Eurosceptic 
fear that a spillover process would take place, where the increasing number of same-sex union 
policies within the EU would indirectly impact the definition of marriage in Croatia (cf. Kopecký 
and Mudde 2002; Leconte 2008; Leconte 2014). Such feeling could only have been fuelled by 
reporting on EU discussions on ‘mutual recognition’ of same-sex partnership across the EU, 
which the media reported on as the EU forcing Croatia’s hand (Palokaj 2013).  
The question remains, however, whether this value-based Euroscepticism was indeed reflected 
in the referendum results. In other words, was Kevin Moss (2014, p. 228) right to remark that: 
‘the referendum results also showed that the more European (and less Balkan) parts of Croatia 
were indeed more tolerant’? 
The primary objective of this article is to examine municipal-level voting: to see whether 
contemporary commentaries about voting patterns during the referendum can be verified or 
refuted, especially the link between support for the EU and support for constitutional protection 
of heterosexual marriage. Since the data are only disaggregated at the municipal level, we are 
unable to ascertain individual motives for voting behaviour, but we can establish how voting 
varied amongst communities across the country. 
 
Data and Analyses 
 
Individual-level Data and Analysis 
 
 
Since value-based Euroscepticism is an individual-level phenomenon, we first sought to 
establish whether there is sufficient evidence suggesting a link between value-based 
 
Euroscepticism and attitudes towards homosexuality at the individual level. To do this we 
analysed the most recent social attitudes survey conducted in Croatia that contained questions 
about attitudes towards homosexuality as well as an acceptable operationalization of value-
based Euroscepticism — in the case of Croatia, this is the 2008 European Values Survey (EVS). 
We used respondents’ answer to the question ‘Do you justify homosexuality?’ (Q68H) as the 
dependent variable. The variable is originally coded as a ten-point Likert-scale, but due to its 
highly skewed distribution, we have decided to dichotomise the variable. We recoded the 
variable as 1 ‘Homosexuality is not justified’ for the answers ranging from 1 to 5, and 0 
‘Homosexuality is justified’ for the answers 6 to 10. The explanatory variable of interest is 
whether respondents fear EU integration would lead Croatia to ‘lose [its] national identity / 
culture’ (Q73B). This variable is negatively coded as a ten-point scale, with 1 as ‘very much 
afraid that the EU will cause a loss of national identity/culture’ and 10 as ‘not afraid at all that 
EU will cause a loss of national identity’. Thus a higher score in this variable represents less 
value-based Euroscepticism. 
These two variables allow us to analyses whether there is a link in Croatia between value-based 
Euroscepticism and attitudes towards homosexuality. Using a binary logistic (logit) regression, 
and adding controls for gender, age, education, and religious affiliation,11 we find evidence of 
such a relationship, ceteris paribus. We find that the odds of justifying homosexuality decreases 
by 8.5% for an increase of one point in the level of fear that the EU will cause a loss of national 
identity, ceteris paribus. The regression results are reported in Table 1. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
                                                           
11 We use religious affiliation as measure for religion to maintain consistency with the aggregate-level 
analysis. However, we also conducted the same analysis using ‘attendance of religious services’ as a 
measure for religiosity. Although not reported here, the findings of both analyses were similar and the link 
between value-based Euroscepticism and homophobia was found in both analyses.  
 
Although this individual data dates back to 2008, we believe it to be a strong indicator for the 
relevance of our current study. Since 2008, LGBT rights have only become more closely 
connected to the idea of Europe (Ayoub and Paternotte 2014), and more prominent in the EU 
Enlargement process (Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016). Hence, it is only reasonable to believe 
that this link between value-based Euroscepticism and homonegativity has become stronger as 
well. Moreover, in the course of the Croatian accession process, the issue of fundamental rights 
reached its peak after 2009, when the chapter on fundamental rights finally opened for 
negotiations, in which LGBT was one of the topics. And more recently, the issue same-sex 
marriage (often seen as a European, foreign-imposed agenda) has been framed as a threat to the 
Croatian family, and in extension to the Croatian nation (cf. supra, but also see Pavasovic Trost 
and Slootmaeckers 2015).  
With this initial confirmation that a link between value-based Euroscepticism and 
homonegativity exists at the individual level in Croatia, we now turn to the main focus of the 
article, which seeks to explore whether the 2013 marriage referendum can (partly) be 
interpreted as a proxy for value-based Euroscepticism. To do this, we analyse municipal-level 




Our examination of the relationship between attitudes towards the EU and voting in the 
constitutional referendum of 2013 uses cities and municipalities (henceforth also shortened as 
municipalities) as units of analysis. We obtained electoral data from detailed results available on 
the State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia and the demographic data from the 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics. Results for three recent polls were included in the analysis: the 
Croatian Marriage Referendum (December 2013); the Croatian EU referendum (January 2012); 
and the first Croatian European Parliament election (April 2013). Since we want to establish 
 
factors explaining the level of support for the marriage referendum, we excluded the 2014 
European election and the 2011 parliamentary election, since the former occurred after the 
marriage referendum, and the latter occurred long before the referendum and with different 
constituency boundaries.12 
In addition to the referendum data, we also used data from the 2013 European Parliament to 
gauge the right-left ideological tendencies of municipalities and cities. Given the complex party 
landscape of Croatia, with many small parties, we focused in our analysis on the main right-
leaning party HDZ, and the main left-leaning party SDP (Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske 
[Social Democratic Party of Croatia]). As a proxy for the average ideological orientation of a 
municipality, we used the difference of the vote-shares (in percentages) in the 2013 European 
election between HDZ and SDP, with a positive figure representing higher levels of electoral 
support for the mainstream (right-wing) nationalist HDZ.13  
Using 2011 Croatian census data at the city/municipality level,  we included controls for: gender; 
age; education; and religiosity. These control variables were selected based on previous 
research on individuals’ attitudes towards homosexuality. Previous individual-level comparative 
research on the Western Balkans has shown that levels of homonegativity tend to be lower for 
women compared with men; those with higher levels of education; and those with lower levels 
of religiosity (Brajdić Vuković and Štulhofer 2012, p. 224). Based on the above-mentioned 
suggestions that the referendum tapped into economic grievances and on minority issues in 
general, we included additional controls for unemployment and ethnicity, which have been 
found to have significant effects on voting patterns for the marriage referendum (Glaurdić and 
Vuković 2016). Gender was expressed as a percentage of females in the locale. The mean age of 
the active population (> 15 years old) was calculated using group midpoints (age is categorised 
                                                           
12 The two referendums and European Parliament election take Croatia as a single constituency, whilst 
parliamentary elections are run in ten different Croatian constituencies, one constituency for Diaspora, 
and one constituency for national minorities.  
13 We also use the relative vote-share between SDP and HDZ as a proxy for government support, since the 
former are the main ruling party and the latter are the main opposition party. 
 
in five-year intervals in the census data, with the oldest category being 95 years of age and 
above). We calculated the percentage of active populations that completed higher education as a 
measure for average education in a municipality. To gauge the mean religiosity within a 
municipality, we used the percentage of census respondents who said that they were not 
religious or atheists. Unemployment is measured as the percentage of unemployed people aged 
15 or older. This percentage excludes economically inactive people, e.g. students and retired 
people. Finally, we included the percentage of census respondents within a municipality who 
said that they were Serbs since they are the largest national minority in Croatia (with 4.36% of 
the population). 
The descriptive statistics for all variables are summarised in Table 2. 
 




We conduct a path analysis in order to examine the extent to which the outcome of the marriage 
referendum can be explained by attitudes towards the EU. We selected this technique over 
regular multivariate regression for two reasons: the structure of our data; and the complexity of 
our causal model. As our dataset is compiled by combining census data and electoral data from 
three different events, the variables in our model are temporally sequenced, and there is no 
feedback between events. A dynamic path model allows the explicit modelling of such a data 
structure. The temporal sequence of the variables, furthermore, supports the causality 
assumptions of path analysis (Tacq 1997). A second reason why we prefer path analysis to 
regular multivariate regression analysis is the complex causal structure of our variables. Path 
analysis allows for modelling and testing intermediate causal links, and detecting spurious 
relationships. While multivariate regression can control for variables, reducing the problem of 
 
spuriousness and intermediate effects, the temporal sequence of our variables suggests that 
explicitly modelling these indirect paths is warranted. We estimate the path model using 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). 
To estimate the model, we use the Lavaan (v0.5-16) R package (Rosseel 2012).  We estimated 
our final model by starting with a model of the electoral data (see Figure 1), where we control 
for all socio-demographic variables of the census data. To improve the goodness-of-fit of this 
initial model, we deleted non-significant paths from the model stepwise (backwards modelling), 
whilst keeping an eye on the modification indices in order to ensure that we did not wrongly 
omit some of the non-significant paths. To test the indirect effects, we follow the 
recommendation to use bootstrapped standard errors (see e.g. Preacher and Hayes 2008). 
Bootstrapping standard errors has the additional advantage of overcoming potential violation of 
the normality assumption of the sampling distribution of the estimates of proportion-based 
variables (Moore and McCabe 2005). 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Results of the municipal-level analysis 
 
Figure 2 presents the final model of our analyses with standardised coefficients for all 
statistically significant paths. Looking at the model, it becomes immediately clear that we did not 
find any effect for the gender balance of the community on any of our endogenous variables. 
While gender is often cited as one of the main explanations of individuals’ behaviour, we believe  
that the lack of a gender effect in this study is due to our unit of analysis. By studying the 
aggregate level, we believe the individual differences between men and women are cancelled out 
by a gender composition of the community. This is because the variation in gender balance 
 
across municipalities is small: the proportion of women in a municipality is on average 50.75% 
(stand. dev. = 1.198) and ranges from 45.26% to 54.00% (see Table 1). 
Although the outcome of the marriage referendum is the main variable of interest, for the sake 
of completeness, we will discuss the results of our analysis step-by-step, from left to right. Thus, 
although we start our discussion with by a brief discussion of our results for the EU referendum 
variables and work our way through the path model all the way to the outcome of the marriage 
referendum, i.e. the proportion of ‘yes’ votes, such description should not be interpreted from a 
comparative angle.14 In fact, we provide such detailed description to enable a full understanding 
of the path model and the complexity of indirect effects of different variables on the marriage 
referendum outcome.   
First, regarding the turnout for the EU referendum in January 2012, we find that in 
municipalities with a lower age average, a higher percentage of higher educated people, less 
unemployed people, and a lower proportion of Serbs the turnout for the EU referendum tends to 
be higher (Table 3). When it comes to the percentage of Eurosceptic votes (that is, votes against 
EU accession), we find that communities with fewer unemployed people, fewer Serbs, and fewer 
non-religious people were more likely to have voted against EU accession. In addition to these 
socio-demographic effects, we find that the percentage of ‘no’ votes tend to be higher in 
municipalities with a higher turnout for the EU referendum. These results, however, do not 
necessarily reflect the relation between these characteristics and votes against EU accession at 
the individual level. This difference between individual level and aggregate level effects is clearly 
illustrated by the effects of education and age on Euroscepticism. While older and lesser 
educated people tend to say no to EU accession at the individual level (Štulhofer 2006; Tverdova 
and Anderson 2004), we do not find such an effect on the aggregate level. 
                                                           
14 Indeed, the aim of this article is not to explain the outcome of the EU referendum. Rather we seek to 
shed light on the link between the EU referendum and the marriage referendum. In order to test this 
relationship accurately, it is important to understand the determinants for both referendum variables in 
order to be assured that our conclusions are not an attribute of spurious relationships. Moreover, the 
step-by-step presentation follows common practice for the reporting of path models.  
 
The above aggregate-level analysis also provides an interesting result regarding religion, 
whereby communities with more religious people (i.e., Catholics) tended to have higher levels of 
Eurosceptic votes. This is surprising, given that the Catholic Church urged voters to support 
accession in the 2012 referendum (Vatican Insider 2012), and Catholics are comparatively more 
likely to have positive attitudes towards European integration in other countries (Nelsen, Guth & 
Fraser 2001). Perica (2006) found two dominant strands in Croatian Church framings of 
accession, both of which are pro-EU: clericalists see Croatian Catholicism as special, and as a 
bulwark against the ‘East’, which should be rewarded with membership; and liberals see Croatia 
as being a modern country with strong European credentials which would be furthered through 
accession. This being the case, one would expect that support for EU membership is not 
determined by religiosity. Nevertheless, it has been observed that Croatian Church played and 
still plays a balancing act of being a ‘pro-EU Eurosceptic,’ taking critical positions on the foreign 
ownership of real estate (by Cardinal Bozanić) and the delay of accession tied to war-crimes 
prosecution (Perica 2006), as well as some of EU values (see Pavasovic Trost and Slootmaeckers 
2015). Indeed, drawing on the case of the Polish Catholic Church during accession in Poland, 
Guerra (2015) argues that the Croatian Church (and its privileged domestic position) might be 
threatened by EU-triggered modernisation/democratisation processes. The Catholic Church may 
see itself in the role of a defender against secularism from the ‘outside’, and take a Eurosceptic 
position to defend national sovereignty and values (as it did during the marriage referendum). 
Thus, whilst it would be reasonable to interpret the municipal-level relationship between 
religiosity and Eurosceptic vote in 2012 as a consequence of the Church’s ‘mixed signals,’ we 
remain cautious of this interpretation as individual-level effects do not always play out at the 
aggregate level. Alternatively, the finding could reflect a spurious relationship due to a variable 
omitted from our analysis. 
Turning to the vote difference between the main opposition party (HDZ) and main government 
party (SDP) during the European Parliament elections, we find that communities that had a 
 
higher turnout for the EU referendum were more likely to vote in favour of the current 
governing party. This finding combined with the positive relation between the proportion of 
votes against EU accession and the votes in favour of the opposition supports Anderson’s (1998) 
notion that when citizens have little knowledge or experience with the EU, they use the national 
context as a proxy for the EU. Studying Croatia, Babarović, Čilić Burušić, and Burušić (2011) 
found that support for the then HDZ-led government was positively associated with attitudes 
towards EU accession. Although the authors urged for a cautious interpretation of their results, 
our finding — that communities which tended to vote against EU accession are more inclined to 
vote for the opposition party (i.e., HDZ; since 2011 the government is SDP-led)— suggests that 
Anderson’s (1998) ‘support for government’ hypothesis is credible within the Croatian context. 
The negative relationship between turnout for the EU referendum and opposition votes, 
furthermore, corroborates this notion, since the turnout variable, which in the model is 
controlled for Euroscepticism, can be interpreted as a proxy for favourable attitudes towards the 
EU. The vote difference between the opposition and government party is further explained by 
the average age, as well as the proportion of Serbs, unemployed people and non-religious people 
in a municipality, with the opposition party receiving more votes in those communities with, on 
average, an older population, more unemployed people, a smaller proportion of Serbs, and less 
non-religious people. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
The turnout for the 2013 marriage referendum in 2013 is positively related to the turnout for 
the EU referendum. This effect can easily be understood as a path dependency. The marriage 
referendum turnout also tends to be higher in municipalities with a higher percentage of people 
with higher education and a lower proportion of religious people. While the effect of religion is 
easy to explain (the Croatian Catholic Church strongly opposes same-sex marriage, and the civic 
 
initiative had strong ties with the Church in Croatia), the effect of higher education is less 
obvious. One explanation could be that higher educated people were more aware of the 
consequences of the referendum, and were, therefore, more likely to go and vote. One has to be 
very cautious, though, when interpreting the effect in those terms, as we cannot be certain that 
this individualistic effect also operates at the aggregate level. Another, more aggregate level 
explanation would be that higher educated people tend to live in places where there is a higher 
turnout, like in urban areas, i.e. there is a possibility that the relationship between the 
proportion of educated people and the marriage referendum turnout is spurious. However, we 
lack the data to test this aggregate-level interpretation. Additionally, we find that municipalities 
with a higher percentage against EU accession and with more votes for HDZ generally have a 
higher turnout for the marriage referendum. From this, we can conclude that more Eurosceptic 
municipalities tend to have a higher turnout for the referendum. Again, one has to be cautious 
when interpreting the effect of the votes for the opposition party, though. Although we have 
earlier said that the votes for the opposition party can indeed be seen as a proxy for 
Euroscepticism, the effect of this variable on other variables might follow other causes, for it can 
also point to the different between a vote for a more right-wing versus a more left-wing party, or 
between a conservative and progressive party. So, while we do find an effect for the opposition 
vote on the turnout of the marriage referendum, the causes of this effect remain unclear. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Finally, the outcome of the marriage referendum is very well explained by our model (R2= .846; 
see Table 3). As the percentage of ‘yes’ votes for the marriage referendum is the variable of main 
interest, we decomposed the effects of all variables into direct and indirect effects (see Table 3). 
If we look at the effects of the socio-demographic variables on the proportion of ‘yes’ votes, we 
first find that there is no direct effect of the average age of a municipality. So while age is a 
 
strong predictor for homophobia at the individual level, we do not find such an effect (at least 
not directly) at the aggregate level. This, however, does not mean that there is no effect at all of 
the average age on the referendum result, for age has a positive indirect effect (b = .681; ß .148) 
on the proportion of yes votes via the ‘EU turnout’ and the difference between shares of the 
main opposition and government party in the European Parliament elections. For the other 
socio-demographic variables, we find a rather large and strong effect of the percentage of non-
religious people (both directly and indirectly). We also find a negative effect of the proportion of 
Serbs on the outcome of the marriage referendum. While the effect of the proportion of 
unemployed people is positive, with the indirect path being the strongest component, the direct 
effect of education is negative (the combined indirect effect of education is not significant as 
both indirect paths cancel each other out). Taking all this together, we find that the proportion of 
votes in favour of the constitutional definition of marriage tends to be higher in those 
municipalities with a higher average age, more unemployed people, and a smaller proportion of 
higher education people, Serbs, and non-religious people.  
Turning to the variables of main interest, if the outcome of the referendum was partly guided by 
value-based Euroscepticism, we would expect a significant effect of our EU variables (vote 
against EU accession and outcome for EU referendum) on the percentage of yes votes for the 
marriage referendum. At the same time, we would expect this effect to be smaller than some 
other dimensions that dominated the debates prior to the referendum (i.e. religiosity and moral 
orientation, conservative versus progressive, and the ethnic minority frames). Our results 
indeed support these hypotheses. We find confirmation that the outcome of the marriage 
referendum is partly guided by value-based Euroscepticism, at least at the aggregate level. First, 
we find positive indirect and direct effects of Eurosceptic votes in the EU referendum on the 
outcome of the marriage referendum. In municipalities with a higher proportion of votes against 
EU accession the proportion of yes votes in the marriage referendum tends to be higher (ß = 
.111; p < .001). This significant direct effect supports the hypothesis that the marriage 
 
referendum tapped into disenchantment with the EU. A finding which is further corroborated by 
the indirect effect via the difference in vote share of the main opposition and government 
parties, which as we have shown above can be interpreted as a proxy for Euroscepticism (ß= 
.153; p < .001).15 The European dimension of the referendum outcome, albeit secondary, is also 
confirmed by the strong effect of Europhile measure (EU referendum turnout) on the outcome of 
the marriage referendum. In municipalities with a higher EU turnout, which here is interpreted 
as a proxy for pro-EU attitudes, the proportion of votes in favour of the constitutional definition 
of marriage tends to be lower (ß = - .543; p < .001). Our interpretation of the EU referendum 
turnout and ‘yes’ votes for the marriage referendum as a link between pro-EU attitudes and the 
marriage referendum is further supported by our finding that the indirect effect of the EU 
turnout via its Eurosceptic paths (via votes against EU accession) is not significant (see Table 3). 
In sum, our model is very successful in explaining the outcome of the marriage referendum at 
the municipal level. We find four main dimensions that influenced the proportion of yes votes in 
a community: religious, minority, domestic politics, and EU dimensions. We found that in 
communities where there are proportionally less non-religious people, i.e. more religious 
communities, the support for the constitutional definition of marriage was generally higher. This 
result is not surprising given the origin of the civic initiative and the support it gained from the 
Church. Secondly, we find that the tactic of the protiv campaign to make the referendum about 
minority rights, rather than just LGBT rights, found resonance since our results show that in 
community with a larger proportion of the Serb minority the support for the marriage 
referendum was generally lower. Thirdly, our analyses support the claim of some political 
analysts that the referendum was able to tap into the growing disenchantment with the EU and 
                                                           
15 When interpreting the effects of the difference in vote share of the opposition and government parties, 
one has to remain cautious as this variable also reflects Euroscepticism when included in a path 
containing an EU variable. On its own, however, the variable reflects the difference between more right-
wing conservative, and more left-wing progressive parties, especially when not included in path including 
a Eurosceptic measure. Therefore, we are inclined to interpret the positive direct and indirect effects of 
the difference in vote share as a consequence of this conservative-progressive dimension.  
 
thus value-based Euroscepticism. We find that support for the EU (measured here as turnout for 
the EU referendum) and scepticism towards the EU (measured as votes against EU accession) 
are respectably negatively and positively related to the proportion of ‘yes’ votes in the marriage 
referendum. These effects become stronger when we take into account the difference in votes 
for the opposition and government parties, which as part of the EU related paths can be 
interpreted as a proxy for disenchantment with the EU. Finally, in line with the work of Glaurdić 
and Vuković (2016), who argued that the referendum can be explained by support for the main 
electoral block in Croatia, we identified governmental support as the fourth dimension 
influencing the marriage referendum outcome. Thus, we find partial support for the statement of 
the Jutarnji list commentator that ‘This vote is not about marriage or the definition of marriage, 
this is a referendum against the current government’ (quoted in EurActiv 2013). Municipalities, 
where the governmental parties did better than the oppositional parties in the 2013 EP 




We started this analysis with the modest goal to empirically test claims made in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2013 Croatian marriage referendum. However, by doing so the article also 
extends our understanding of the proxy politics of the referendum by adding a European 
dimension. Indeed, whereas Glaurdić and Vuković (2016) focussed their analysis on the 
domestic proxy politics of the referendum, we argued that the topic of the referendum has an 
undeniable international and European characteristic and failing to recognise the European 
politics of same-sex marriage would provide only a partial analysis of the referendum outcome. 
This is especially the case if one considers that the referendum campaign started around the 
time of Croatia’s accession to the EU, and when the actors within the EU were engaged in a 
 
discussion on the freedom of movement of LGBT couples — and thus of mutual recognition of 
same-sex partnerships. In order to analyse the European dimension of the referendum, we 
employed Leconte’s (2014) notion of value-based Euroscepticism as analytical framework, as a 
bridge between the domestic and European political dimensions of the marriage vote. The value-
based Euroscepticism framework suggests that the EU’s fundamental rights policy sparked a 
fear that closer European integration would alter and threaten the fundamental values of the 
nation. Thus, the increasing recognition of same-sex marriages and the EU’s creeping 
homonationalism lead the feeling that Croatia’s membership of the EU would put the same-sex 
marriage on the political agenda. That being the case, the referendum could then be interpreted 
as a pre-emptive measure to block any spillover effect from EU membership on Croatian family 
values.  
Empirically, we analysed the politics of the 2013 marriage referendum in two stages. First, we 
established at the individual level that a link between value-based Euroscepticism and attitudes 
towards homosexuality is indeed present in Croatia. Whilst we believe this preliminary analysis 
was a prerequisite for analysing the referendum’s aggregate voting behaviour using a value-
based Euroscepticism analytical framework —such analysis would only makes sense if such a 
link would exist at the individual level — this initial analysis should not be mistaken for an 
invitation to extrapolate our results to the individual level. Indeed, the reader should bear in 
mind that the results of our main analysis only speak to the aggregate level and cannot and 
should not be translated to the individual level. Whilst the lack of individual data is indeed an 
important limitation of our study — which leaves other vital research questions unanswered 
(e.g., relating individual-level church attendance or age (particularly younger cohorts) to value-
based Euroscepticism) —, the analysis of the aggregate level, nevertheless, still provides 
important results that provide insights in the different dimensions that guided the outcome of 
the referendum, as well as insights in the interaction between European and domestic LGBT 
politics.  
 
Indeed, our study discerned four distinct, yet related, factors that explain the level of support in 
municipalities for the marriage referendum. The first two dimensions are not a surprise giving 
the campaign leading up to the referendum. Both the religious character of the citizens’ initiative 
and it support from the Church, and the efforts of the protiv campaign to frame the referendum 
in terms of minority rights (and not just about LGBT) are reflected in the results of the 
referendum. We found that less religious and more ethnically diverse communities, i.e. having a 
larger Serb minority, showed less support for the introduction of a constitutional definition of 
marriage. The two other main dimensions support the notion that LGBT rights have increasingly 
become a symbolic political issue. In line with the previous analyses of Glaurdić and Vuković 
(2016), we found strong effects of domestic politics variables, i.e. support for the ruling 
government. However, our results also indicate that the European context is an important, albeit 
secondary, part of the explanation of the outcome of the marriage referendum. In 
municipalities/cities where the main governing party did better than the main opposition party 
in the 2013 European Parliament elections, and where there were larger turnout and less anti-
EU votes in the 2012 referendum, showed less support for the marriage referendum. Based on 
these results — and guided by the existing link between EU and homonegativity at the individual 
level —, we conclude that the referendum, at least partly, can be interpreted as an expression of 
value-based Euroscepticism and a proactive attempt to halt the Europeanisation of same-sex 
marriage.  
Our analysis, thus, has shown support for the idea that European politics cannot be discarded in 
Croatian same-sex marriage debates, and there is sufficient evidence to conclude that value-
based Euroscepticism played a role during the referendum, albeit as a secondary mechanism. 
And while we cannot draw conclusions about the role of value-based Euroscepticism in 
individual voting behaviour, our findings have several implications for future research. First, it 
provides an analytical framework to understand and research the politics of more recent same-
sex marriage referendums in other countries. Second, and potentially more importantly, our 
 
findings show the value of including value-based Euroscepticism in the analysis of (political) 
homophobia in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. Our findings, thus, contribute to and 
expand the existing theoretical lenses on the homophobic backlashes in new EU member state 
by bridging the arguments that rely on nationalism (Mole 2011) or perceived threat (Ayoub 
2014). Indeed, whereas value-based Euroscepticism can combine elements of both the 
nationalism and perceived threat arguments, it explicitly places the discussion within the 
international context of the EU’s fundamental rights policies. As such, our analysis contributes to 
the overall scholarship of EU enlargement process in candidate (or new) member states, 
especially in relation to the domestic reaction to and rejection of the EU’s self-portrait 
fundamental rights identity.  
Moreover, the case of Croatia also provides an interesting comparative case to further explore 
the link between religion/religiosity and Euroscepticism more generally (Nelsen, Guth & Fraser 
2001). Previous studies have concluded that micro-level features of religion are not sufficient to 
explain levels of Euroscepticism. Thus, it may be more instructive to focus on the macro-level 
role of religious institutions like the Catholic Church in how they can enter political debates and 
ally themselves with Eurosceptic parties (see, for example, Guerra 2012 on Poland). As outlined 
above, the Croatian Catholic Church plays a fine balancing act as a ‘pro-EU Eurosceptic’ pushing 
for the country’s return to European Christendom whilst remaining cynical of some of the 
Union’s policies (Perica 2006), and/or more vehemently resisting threats to national values and 
sovereignty (cf. Ayoub 2014) in the face of a secular supra-national structure (Guerra 2015). 
Value-based Euroscepticism, then, proves to be a valuable analytical framework to analyse the 
balancing act of national religious institutions, especially in a comparative context including 
other new and candidate EU member states, such as Serbia and its Orthodox Church.   
Finally, we believe the limitations of our analysis, which only presents an initial exploration of 
the role of value-based Euroscepticism in the marriage referendum, should be considered as an 
inspiration for avenues for further research. Indeed, the precise (individual-level) link between 
 
value-based Euroscepticism and homophobic politics and voting behaviour, for example, 
requires further scholarly attention. Thus, In order to fully understand the European dimension 
of same-sex marriage referendums, in Croatia and elsewhere, additional qualitative analyses are 
needed to better understand individual-level motivations to support or oppose such initiatives. 
This being said, we want to conclude our article with a remark on the political consequences of 
the referendum in Croatia. Despite the marriage referendum results, Croatian political elites 
have nonetheless been able to preserve the country’s homonationalist and European credentials  
(see also Moss 2014). A few months after the December 2013 poll, the Croatian parliament 
adopted new legislation defining registered ‘life partnerships’ for same-sex couples. Although U 
Ime Obitelji tried to use the referendum results to block this new law, the law passed by an 
overwhelming majority (89 for; 16 against) in parliament. Despite the fact that HDZ showed 
some support for the 2013 marriage referendum, a majority of its parliamentary members voted 
in favour of the life partnership bill. The marriage referendum results led to more symbolic 
rather than substantive changes in LGBT rights, but worryingly, foreshadow how linking 
traditionalist and Eurosceptic perspectives can be mobilised effectively against the Croatian 
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Table 1: Binary logistic regression of Croatian attitudes towards the justification of homosexuality 
 Justification of 
homosexuality 





Religious affiliation  





(reference: middle education) ***  
lower education - 1.232*** (.352) .292 
higher education .614** (.190) 1.848 
Age 
(reference: 30-49 years) ***  
15-29 .447* (.209) 1.563 
50+ - .606** (.216) .545 
 Fear of losing national 
identity / culture (negatively 
coded) 
- .089** 
( .026) 1.093 
Constant - 2.245*** ( .300) .106 
Nagelkerke R2 .142 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; SE in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is whether homosexuality 
can be justified (0=justified, 1=not justified). -2LL = 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Median Min-max 
Electoral Data     
% Yes votes marriage ref. 74,31 15.058 77.05 25.00 – 98.13 
Turnout marriage ref. 32.70 8.938 32.47 3.03 – 73.20 
% No votes EU ref. 34.68 8.337 34.16 15.57 – 63.24 
Turnout EU ref. 44.45 8.992 45.62 6.18 – 82.32 
Opposition – Government votes (EP Elec.) 6.96 24.523 4.97 -83.71 – 77.44 
Control Variables     
% Non-religious 2.20 2.581 1.23 0.00 – 16.66 
% Higher educated 8.83 5.037 7.26 0.88 – 29.56 
Average age 51.06 2.459 50.67 45.87 – 66.85 
% Unemployed 8.04 2.814 7.728 0.26 – 17.59 
% Serbs 5.64 14.402 0.910 0.00 – 97.19 





















Yes votes  







Age (average of adults 
[15+]) 
- .686*** 
(- .204)  
1.284*** 





% Higher educated 
people 
.349***  










































- 3.406 *** 
(- .589) 
EU Referendum 













Votes against EU 












Government votes (EP 
elections ’13) 













R2 .505 .143 .466 .677 .846 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; significant levels are based on bootstrapped standard errors (1000 draws). 
Goodness-of-fit: Chi2 = 2527.981 (Df = 35; p < 001); CFI = .997; TLI = .987;  
RMSEA = .042 (90% confidence interval: .005 – .072); SRMR = .014  
  
 
Figure 1: Starting model for SEM analyses (control variables omitted). 
 
 
Figure 2: Final Path model with standardised path coefficients, with bold lines representing effects of main 
interested and dotted lines for control effects. 
 
 
Note: Goodness-of-fit: Chi2 = 2527.981 (Df = 35; p < 001); CFI = .997; TLI = .987;  
RMSEA = .042 (90% confidence interval: .005 – .072); SRMR = .014 
  
 
 
